








BUT IS THIS REALLY AUTHENTIC? 










Elgin	went	 to	 Rome	to	 consult	with	 the	 renowned	artist,	 but	 Ca-
nova	flatly	declined.	After	examining	the	samples	and	acquainting	
himself	with	the	entire	collection,	he	declared	that	however	badly	







the	 aura	 of	 the	 artist’s	 authorship,	 whose	 mastery	 “testified	 the	
perfection	 to	 which	 art	 had	 advanced	 under	 Phidias	 among	 the	
ancients”1;	on	the	other,	the	acceptance	of	damage	incurred	since	
the	 work’s	 conception,	 inasmuch	 as	 physical	 evidence	 of	 the	
work’s	history	conveys	its	authenticity.		
In	 that	 same	 year,	 the	 Danish	 sculptor	 and	 collector	 Bertel	
Thorvaldsen	 completely	 restored	 the	 sculptures	 of	 the	 pediment	
of	the	Temple of Aphaia	at	Aegina	(Greece),	now	belonging	to	the	
Glyptothek	 in	 Munich,	 including	 the	 addition	 of	 modern	 replace-
ments	 of	 heads,	 drapery	 and	 armor,	 and	 completion	 of	 missing	
sections.	 Thorvaldsen	 did	 his	 job	 very	 thoroughly;	 to	 be	 sure,	
when	 one	 looks	 at	 the	 final	 result,	 the	 differences	 between	 the	
Neoclassical	style,	belonging	to	the	restorer’s	era,	and	the	original	
style	of	 the	 sculptures	are	 no	 immediately	apparent,	but	 the	 dis-
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tance	 between	 creation	 and	 reconstitution	 is	 tangible	 neverthe-
less.	As	early	as	the	late	19th	century,	these	restorations	were	the	
subject	 of	 much	 controversy	 and	 were	 finally	 removed	 between	
1963	 and	 1965,	 with	 a	 few	 critics	 arguing	 that	 the	 deletion	 of	
Thorvaldsen’s	 additions	 sacrificed	 a	 nineteenth-century	 complex	
Gesamtkunstwerk	for	the	sake	of	an	ancient	past.		
















(and	 I	 refer	 to	 Ami	 Harbin	 2008,	 on	 this)	 on	 a	 peculiar	 under-
standing	 of	 authenticity	 as	 either	 a	 ‘static’	 or	 a	 ‘dynamic’	 notion	
and	 invokes	 a	 different	 answer	 to	 the	 familiar	 philosophical	 dis-
pute	 on	 what	 an	 artwork	 is	 ontologically.	 However,	 both	 para-




2. Authenticity in conservation/restoration 








of	 a	 work	 by	 rebuilding,	 repairing,	 repainting,	 or	 generally	 re-
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ideal	 state2.	 Restauration	 is	 thus	 much	 more	 controversial	 than	
conservation.	If	the	distinction	between	natural	aging	and	damage	




past	 few	 decades	 have	 indeed	 witnessed	 increasing	 discomfort	
within	 the	profession	with	what	appears	to	be	a	 lack	of	rigorous	
self-analysis:	 conservation	 today	 needs	 to	 re-evaluate	 itself	 and	
acknowledge	 its	 need	 to	 engage	 in	 greater	 intellectual	 dialogue	
outside	of	the	profession3.	
Out	of	the	many	theoretical	questions	that	arise	after	a	more	
thorough	 consideration	 of	 restoration	 (questions	 of	 ethics	 and	
aesthetics,	 as	 well	 as	 more	 specific	 notions	 on	 the	 identity	 of	
works	of	art),	I	want	to	focus	here	on	one	particular	philosophical	
issue	 par excellence.	 My	 question	 is	 simple	 yet	 the	 answer	 isn’t:	
How	are	we	to	understand	authenticity	from	the	point	of	view	of	
preservation	 theory?	 Any	 attempt	 to	 answer	 this	 question	 re-





2.1 Authenticity: Static or Dynamic? 
Authenticity	is	a	central	philosophical	notion.	We	find	reference	to	
‘authenticity’,	 ‘being	authentic	 to	 oneself’,	 ‘living	authentically’	 in	
ethics	 and	 political	 philosophy	 throughout	 the	 entire	 history	 of	
thought:	 from	 ancient	 Greece,	 throughout	 the	 Enlightenment,	 to	
existentialists	 and	 contemporary	 social	 theorists.	 Although	 these	
views	on	authenticity	vary,	a	common	theme	is	that	authenticity	is	
an	 ideal	 that	 does	 not	 admit	 of	 degrees:	 either	 something	 is	 au-
thentic	or	it	 is	not.	This	explains	why	many	of	the	discussions	on	
authenticity	in	the	philosophy	of	art	have	been	centered	on	an	ei-
ther/or polarization	 around	 the	 notions	 of	authentic/inauthentic,	
original/fake,	 genuine/deceptive,	 true/false,	 real/counterfeit.	
Within	 the	 world	 of	 traditional	 fine	 art	 objects	 to	 say	 that	 some-
                                                 
2	After	the	15th	Triennial	Conference	held	in	September	2008, the	International	Council	
of	Museums	Committee	of	Conservation	(ICOM-CC)	adopted	a	resolution	on	a	terminol-
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thing	 is	 authentic	 is	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 what	 it	 professes	 to	 be,	 or	
what	it	is	reputed	to	be,	in	origin	or	authorship,	with	no	room	for	
uncertainty.	Authentic	objects	hold	within	them	material	evidence	
that	causally	relates	 them	back	to	 the	hand	of	 the	author.	 In	this	
sense,	they	provide	us	with	a	direct	link	to	a	particular	past.	Many	
have	 therefore	 argued	 that	 authenticity	 is	 prerequisite	 for	 our	
aesthetic	appreciation	to come	about	in	the	first	place4.	An	incor-
rect presumption	 or	 discovery	 of	 mistake	 reduces	 the	 aesthetic	
impact	of	the	object	or	even	jeopardises	the	experience	altogether.		
The	 relevance	 of	 judgment	 of	 authenticity	 for	 aesthetic	 ex-
perience	 is	explored	for	example	by	Mark	Sagoff	(1978)	who	be-




it	 induces:	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 object	 is	 crucial	 to	 its	 value;	 one	
must	appreciate	 the	work	 itself.»	(Sagoff	1978,	453)	Establishing	
the	authenticity	of	a	work	of	art,	according	to	Sagoff,	is	to	consider	
it	 unique,	 and	 this	 feature	 of	 uniqueness	 is	 essential	 to	 aesthetic	
appreciation,	since	the	aesthetic	value	and	significance	of	a	work	
of	 art	 can	 only	 be	 assessed	 if	 its	 authenticity	 has	 been	 correctly	
determined.	















lish	 that	 a	 particular	 object	 is	 authentic.	 Procedures	 used	 to	 au-
thenticate	 objects	 can	 concentrate	 for	 instance	 on	 the	 identifica-
                                                 










cision.	 The	 issue,	 however,	 may	 be	 more	 philosophically	 conten-
tious	than	that.		
One	 central	 problem	 is	 for	 instance	 whether	 nominal	 au-
thenticity	is	fully	established	in	the	process	of	the	act	of	creation,	
namely,	 at	 the	 work’s	 initial	 point	 of	 existence.	 Our	 response	 to	
this	question	greatly	influence	which	theory	of	restoration	we	are	
apt	to.	
(1)	 If	 our	 answer	 is	 affirmative	 we	commit	 to	 the	 idea	 that	
authenticity	 is	 totally	 determined	 by	 the	 work’s	 creator.	 An	 art-
work’s	 development	 finishes	 when	 the	 creative	 act	 is	 completed.	
But	given	that	–	after	this	initial	point	of	existence	–	its	identity	is	
constantly	 threatened	 over	 time,	 as	 it	 is	 subjected	 to	 wear	 or	
damage,	our	 job	is	to	do	our	best	to	preserve	 its	original	state	 in	
the	 midst	 of	 potentially	 dangerous	 external	 influences.	 This	 un-
derlies	 a	 peculiar	 conception	 concerning	 the	 temporality	 of	 the	
artwork.	The	technical	and	contextual	 features	of	an	artwork	are	
authentic	 insofar	as	 they	remain	constant,	 that	 is,	 insofar	as	 they	
can	ensure	its	unique	nature.	Authenticity	is	thus	taken	to	be,	so	to	
say,	 a	 universal	given,	 exempt	 from	historical	 flux;	after	 its	 crea-
tion	the	authenticity	of	an	artwork	remains static.	
(2)	If	our	answer	is	negative	we	commit	to	the	view	that	au-
thenticity	 is	 something	 that	 ties	 initial	 creation	 and temporal	
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ty	 (Laurenson	 2006).	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 we	 have	 something,	 a	
substance,	 that	 remains	 the	 same	 entity	 though	 its	 properties	
have	changed,	so	we	need	a	way	of	identifying	that	selfsame	thing	
which	 has	 changed,	 for	 otherwise	 speaking	 of	 change	 would	 be	
impossible.	Determining	this	ontological	 issue	is	crucial	 if	we	are	
to	understand	the	precise	nature	of	an	artwork’s	authenticity. 
By	 considering	 an	 artwork’s	 authenticity	 as	 ultimately	 de-
fined	 at	 the	 point	 of	 creation,	 we	 are	 reducing	 the	 notion	 of	 art-
work	 to	 the	 physical	 object	 it	 is,	 namely,	 to	 the	 ‘configured-and-
conditioned’	object	(Levinson	1989,	279)	it	is	composed	of,	whose	
parts	have	been	structured	in	a	certain	unique	way	by	the	original	
artist.	The	work-identity is	 regarded	as	 coextensive	 to	 the	 object-
identity,	and	consequently	all	changes	in	the	physical	structure	of	
the	 object	 are	 considered	 potential	 damage	 to	 the	 persistence	 of	
the	work6.	Gradual	alteration	over	time	to	this	 is	thus	seen	as	an	
unwelcome	and	hopefully	avoidable	threat.	
Conversely,	 in	 taking	 the	 artwork’s	 authenticity	 as	 time-re-
sistant,	we	are	leaning	towards	regarding	an	artwork	as	a	histori-
cal being.	 Though	 we	 may	 acknowledge	 the	 relevance	 of	 the	
work’s	origins,	 we	also	 accept	 its	extended,	 ongoing,	 temporality	
as	 essential	 to	 its	 identity.	 Taken	 as	 a	 ‘living	 individual’,	 an	 art-
work	can	be	seen	as	experiencing	change	and	alteration	as	part	of	
its	normal	life.	The	same	plant	is	first	just	a	small	one,	then	grows	
to	maturity,	and	then	declines:	yet,	 its	identity	 is	not	 jeopardized	
by	 these	 changes7.	 Beginning	 with	 its	 creation	 and	 the	 elements	
                                                 
6	This	position	can	be	thought	of	as	consistent	with	what	Wollheim	famously	called	the	








and persisting through history,	ones	which	merely	have	a	certain	form”	since,	“all	of	these	
things	come	into	and	go	out	of	existence,	change,	interact	with	other	historical	individu-
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that	 went	 into	 establishing	 its	 nominal	 authenticity	 (e.g.,	 tech-
niques	of	the	era,	the	artist	or	the	geographical	sources	of	the	ma-
terials	used),	the	life	of	the	artwork	extends	over	time.	It	is	in	this	









valdsen’s	 paradigm’.	 The	 authenticity	 of	 the	 work	 is	 seen	 in	 this	
view	as	ultimately	defined	at	the	point	of	creation,	thus	concerted	
effort	is	made	to	restore	what	is	perceived	to	be	the	original	aes-
thetic	 nature	 of	 the	 material	 object.	 Since	 the	 artwork	 coincides	
with	the	object	it	is,	the	only	way	to	preserve	it	is	by	reestablish-
ing	 its	original	 features,	bringing	 it	back	to	 the	way	 it	was	at	 the	
time	of	creation.	This	involves	imagining	artworks	as	they	were	at	
the	 time	 of	 completion,	 as	 if	 we	 could	 step	 into	 a	 time	 machine;	
philosophically,	it	draws	on	the	idealistic	idea	that	artworks	are	a-
temporal	entities,	only	contingently	related	to	the	material	objects	
that	 constitute	 them,	 something	 outside	 of	 reality,	 like	 Platonic	
forms	 (Carrier	 2009).	 Restorers	 who	 endorse	 this	 ‘integral’	 ap-
proach	are	prone	to	take	on	the	role	of	the	artist.	However,	while	
trying	to	return	a	 work	to	 its	original	condition,	 they	may	create	
an	 actual	 historical	 falsification.	 For	 example,	 in	 rebuilding	 parts	







regarded	 as	 historical	 documents	 whose	 value	 resides	 primarily	
in	 the	 age:	 the	 greater	 the	 age,	 the	 greater	 the	 value,	 the	 greater	
the	 authenticity.	 Interventions	 are	 therefore	 aimed	at	 preserving	
what	 remains,	 limiting	 actions	 to	 the	 avoidance	 of	 deterioration.	
However,	 this	 ‘purist’	 approach	 seems	 only	 viable	 in	 the	 case	 of	
archeological	 artifacts	 and	 ancient	 works	 of	 art	 such	 as	 the	 Par-
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we	cannot	always	view	a	work	of	art	as	if	it	were	a	document,	an	





4. Problems with the two paradigms 
Are	we	really	forced	to	choose	between	either	completely	restor-
ing	 an	 artwork	 to	 enhance	 its	 aesthetic	 value	 (whereby	 compro-
mising	 its	 documental	 character)	 or	 maintaining	 it	 in	 its	 status	





ca	(‘aesthetic	 case’	 or	 ‘aesthetic	 demand’)	 and	 the	 istanza stori-
ca (i.e.,	roughly,	the	historical	value	of	the	artwork).		
Brandi	 argues	 that	 the	 work	 of	 art	 always	 offers	 itself	 in	 a	
twofold	way.	It	has	an	impact	on	the	viewer	both	as	an	artistic	ex-
emplar,	 with	 unique	 aesthetic	 features	 and	 properties,	 and	 as	 a	
historical	document	of	human	history.	He	considers	aesthetic	val-
ue	 to	 be	 the	 most	 important	 criterion	 for	 conservation	 in	 most	
cases:	when	the	signs	of	time	on	a	given	piece	of	art	compromise	
its	aesthetic	value	and	appreciation	they	must	indeed	be	removed	
in	 the	 conservation	 process:	 «if	 the	 addition	 disturbs,	 perverts,	
conceals	or	hides	the	artwork	to	some	extent,	 it	 is	clear	that	this	
addition	must	be	removed»	(Brandi	2005,	73).	However,	aesthetic	




This	 explains	 why,	 according	 to	 Brandi,	 arguments	 for	 pre-
serving	 either	 the	 aesthetic	 value	 of	 an	 object	 –	 as	 in	 Thorvald-
sen’s	integral	restoration	model	–		or	its	age	–	as	in	Canova’s	pur-
ist	approach	–		are	ultimately	inconclusive.	No	available	evidence	
shows	 that	 any	 of	 these	 procedures	 is	 correct.	 In	 fact,	 that	 be-
tween	historic	value	and	aesthetic	value	is	a	false	alternative.	Try-
ing	to	find	a	balance	between	the	two	demands	is	instead	the	cru-
cial	 aim	 of	 preservation	 science:	«The	 relationship	 between	 both	










an	 ontological	 perspective.	 Although	 it	 may	 be	 appealing	 to	 con-
sider	works	of	art	like	simple	physical	objects	or	individual	living	
beings,	 the	 analogy	 is	 in	 both	 cases	 not	 tenable	 metaphysically	
speaking.	In	the	first	place,	while	physical	objects	survive	the	gra-
dual	replacement	of	their	original	parts,	artworks	do	not.	A	com-
puter	 is	 the	 same	 object	 though	 its	 original	 components	 may	 be	











and	passing	 away»	(Wiggins	 2012,	 10).	Aristotle	 has	 an	 effective	
way	of	stating	this:	the	term	‘nature’	he	claims,	cannot	be	referred	
to	artifacts,	since	 ‘nature’	refers	 to	 the	 inner	source	of	cause	and	
change,	 while	 artifacts,	 apart	 from	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 matter	 that	
composes	 them,	 lack	 inner	 principles	 of	 change	 and	 rest	 (Meta-
physics	192b13-23).		
 
4.1 Artworks as social objects 
Within	 the	 range	 of	 options	 conventionally	 considered	 by	 meta-
physicians,	a	more	promising	one	may	be	to	consider	artworks	as	
social	 entities	 rather	 than	 physical	 objects	 or	 living	 beings.	 The	
notion	 of	 social object	notably	 comes	 from	 John	 Searle	
(1995),	who	 uses	 the	 term	 in	 the	 broadest	 possible	 sense	 to	 in-
clude	all	 individual	 things,	powers,	and	relations	that	depend	for	
their	very	existence	on	human	conventions,	practices,	institutions;	
basically,	 on	 collective	 intentionality.	 Artworks	 are	 social	 objects	
                                                 
9	We	actually	tend	to	think	about	works	of	art	as	being	infused	with	an	essential	human-
ness	or	spirit.	Cf.	with	Newman,	G.E.,	D.M.	Bartels	and	R.K.	Smith	(2014).	The	authors	of	













society	 in	 a	 particular	 time.	 In	 this	network	of	conventions,	 each	
art	 form	 establishes	 criteria	 for	 identifying	 single	 artworks	 and	
appropriately	experiencing	their	aesthetic	qualities.		
More	 relevantly	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 restoration,	 as	 opposed	 to	
physical	objects,	social	entities	–	like	states,	institutions,	organiza-
tions	 –	 can	 survive	 change	 if	 there	 is	 sufficient	 continuity.	 Con-
temporary	Italy	is	the	same	country	it	was	under	the	rule	of	King	
Vittorio	Emanuele	II	in	1861,	though	it	is	now	a	democracy	and	its	
borders	 have	 changed	 somewhat,	 whereas	 the	 Kingdom	 of	 the	
Two	 Sicilies	 ceased	 to	 exist	 when	 it	 was	 incorporated	 into	 the	
Kingdom	of	Italy	and	the	last	Bourbon	king	was	deposed.	We	can	
say	that	only	in	the	first	case	 is	there	sufficient	continuity	 for	the	
object	 to	 have	 survived	 the	 radical	 changes	 it	 underwent.	 Let	 us	
grant,	for	the	sake	of	the	argument,	the	analogy	between	artworks	
and	social	objects:	this	leads	us	yet	to	the	question	as	to	how	we	
can	 measure	 artworks’	 continuity,	 and,	 especially,	 how	 we	 can	
preserve	it.	
 







France,	 Jean-Pierre	 Mohen:	 «Readability	 is	 an	 extremely	 impor-
tant	 notion.	 It guarantees the authenticity of the artwork,	 its state 
of conservation and its capacity to transmit its aesthetic and cultur-
al message».10	Artworks’	authenticity	could	accordingly	be	under-
stood	in	terms	of	continuity	of	‘readability’.	However,	readability,	
as	 a	 criterion	 for	 restoration,	 seems	 particularly	 vague.	 How	 are	
we	to	understand	it?		
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Again,	 we	 can	 gain	 some	 insight	 from	 reading	 Brandi’s	
Theory of Restoration.	 The	 artist,	 Brandi	 states,	 creates	 a	 certain	
material	 structure	 with	 a	 certain	 visible	 appearance	 to	 convey	
what	 he	 calls	 immagine,	 the	 image	 of	 the	 work.	 In	 the	 case	 of	an	
altarpiece,	the	wood	panel	 is	the	structure	whose	visible	appear-
ance	–	 the	picture	–	 transmits	(but	does	not	 coincide	with11)	 the	
work’s	image.	The	material	object	is	but	a	«vehicle	for	an	image’s	
epiphany»	(Brandi	2005,	51).	Unfortunately,	 the	Theory	offers	lit-
tle	 clarification	 as	 to	 the	 precise	 meaning	 of	 the	 term	 ‘image’:	 to	
understand	 it	 one	 should	refer	 to	 the	 philosophical	context	in	
which	 the	essay	was	 written	 –	 many	 of	 the	 notions	 used	 can	 be	
traced	back	to	existentialist	philosophy	–	and	read	other	works	by	











consciousness;	 that	 is,	 in	 keeping	 its	 image	 perceivable,	 unders-
tandable	and	appreciable	–	in	a	word,	readable.		
This	leads	us	to	re-consider	the	intuitive	assumption	that	the	





to	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 image. Perhaps	 in	 the	 end	 authenticity	
does	not	actually	have	much	to	do	with	the	fact	that	a	given	physi-
cal	object	has	been	left	untouched	by	the slings and arrows of out-
rageous fortune.	Indeed,	authenticity	may	not	simply	lie	within	the	
physical	realm.	
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One	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 that	 the	 way	 we	 perceive	 art	 objects	
depends	on	our	experience	of	other	art	 that	 the	artist	or	her/his	
coevals	 could	 never	 know	 (see:	 Carrier	 2009,	 205).	 In	 order	 to	
view	a	17th	century	painting	unchanged,	we	would	have	to	know	
how	 an	 educated	 audience	 of	 the	 time	 would	 have	 perceived	 it,	
learn	 much	 which	 they	 would	 have	 found	 obvious,	 and	 forget	 in	
the	meanwhile	what	we	know	about	later	art	history.	Another	re-
lated	reason	 is	 that	changes	 in	context	can	change	how	 we	see	a	
work.	 When	 an	 altarpiece	 is	 moved	 from	 a	 church	 to	 a	 museum	
and	placed	near	modern	secular	art,	 it	 looks	different.	Its	context	




evaluation,	 context,	and	 function	have	such	a	 strong	 impact	 on	 a	
work’s	identity,	it	follows	that	most	attempts	to	safeguard	authen-
ticity	 solely	 by	 safeguarding	 the	 original	 physical	 object	 (for	 ex-
ample	 by	 musealizing	 the	 art	 piece)	 are	 condemned	 to	 failure	 a 
priori.		
	





diagram	 proposed	 by	 art	 conservator	 Jonathan	 Kemp	 (2009)	
might	be	useful	in	this	regard.	Kemp’s	thesis	is	that	every	work	of	
art	can	be	hypothetically	plotted	at	any	given	time	between	three	
temporal	 axes,	 where	 each	 axis	 describes	 variables	 stemming	
from	 an	 (ideal)	 ‘ground	 zero’	 of	 an	 object’s	 origin.	 The	 z-axis	





























ry	 from	which,	at	any	 one	point,	 the	object	will	have	stronger	or	
weaker	 genealogical	 links	 to	 its	 origins»	 (Kemp	 2009,	 65).	
Changes	in	multiple	axes	give	each	object	a	unique	topology,	with	
its	 boundaries	 closer	 or	 farther	 away	 from	 its	 ‘impossible-to-
return-to’	ground	zero.	When	art	objects	are	plotted	along	the	giv-
en	 axes,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 they	 don’t	 fit	 into	 the	 dichotomic 
categories	of	being	authentic	or	non-authentic.	





that	 is	 known	 has	 been	 a	 regular	 conservation	 process	 until	 at	




other	 stake-holders	 make	 always	 modify	 the	 coordinates	 of	 a	
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cause,	 as	 Kemp’s	 diagram	 helps	 us	 understand,	 all autographic	
works	 have	 an	 allographic	 component	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	
preservation	 theory.	 When	 the	 same	 piece	 of	 art	 is	 considered	
from	 two	 different	 moments	 in	 its	 history,	 each	 moment	 can	 be	
viewed,	to	a	certain	extent,	as	an	instance	of	the	work	plotted	by	a	




plore	 alternative	 ways	 of	 understanding	 authenticity	 that	 might	
be	 helpful	 to	 restoration.	 In	 this	 model	 authenticity	 admit	 of	 de-
grees	 (i.e.	 a	 performance	 can	 be	 more	 or	 less	 authentic)	 and	 is	
measured	 against	 the	 designation	 of	 work	 defining	 properties,	
properties,	 that	 is,	 that	are	 important	 to	 the	 identity	of	 the	work	
(which	leaves	room	for	 interpretation).	This	also	helps	us	switch	
the	focus	of	restoration	to	documentation,	the	use	of	which	–	just	
as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 allographic	 works	 of	 art	 –	 ensures	 multiple	 au-
thentic	instances	of	a	work.	Documentation,	whether	it	be	written	
reports,	 database	 entries,	 images,	 photographs	 or	 material	 evi-
dences,	 represents	 indeed	 an	 attempt	 to	 capture	 the	 work-
defining	properties.	The	fact	that	restoration’s	methodological	ef-
ficiency	must	rely	 on	 documentation	 is	 also	particularly	 relevant	
because	it	allows	for	the	complete	reversibility	of	any	intervention	
–	a	key	principle	in	today’s	preservation	ethics.	Any	material	evi-
dence	 of	 the	 changes	 made	 on	 a	 piece	 of	 art	 (removed,	 re-
perfected	 or	 re-arranged	 material	 etc.)	 must	 be	 archived	 and	
should	 always	 be	 accompanied	 by	 written	 documentation,	 since	
this	 serves	 «as	 a	 proof	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 art	 restoration	 and	 its	
principles»	 (Hoeniger	 2009,	 101).	 But	 documentation	 does	 not	
only	provide	a	record	of	the	decision-making	process	on	the	part	
of	conservators	so	that	future	custodians	can	reverse	the	process,	
it	 also	 sketches	 the	 trajectory	 of	 the	 artwork	 toward	 one	 or	 the	
other	vectors	of	the	diagram,	thus	‘mapping’	its	authenticity.		
Authenticity	 thus	becomes	 a	 function	 of	 the	«accuracy	with	
which	the	present	cultural	apparatus	plots	an	object	and	provides	
a	 full	 commentary	 on	 how	 its	 particular	 interpretation	 relates	 to	
that	of	its	predecessors»	(Kemp	2009,	65)	and	can	be	redefined	in	
this	 sense	 as	 a	 complex	 notion	 that	 refutes	 by	 essence	 either/or 
polarizations	around	the	notions	of	true/false,	genuine/deceptive,	
original/fake.	 If	 we	 treat	 authenticity	 as	 a	 black-or-white	 affair,	
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concept	 of	 culture:	 when	 prominence	 is	 given	 to	 the	 process	 ra-
ther	 than	 to	 the	 product;	 when	 symbolic	 values	 are	 preferred	 to	
material	 values;	 when	 aesthetic	 interests	 prevail	 on	 historical	




art.	 Restorers	 need	 to	 find	 a	 happy	 medium	 between	 preserving	
each	and	every	material	feature	of	the	object	and	modify	it	to	sat-






al	 relevance	 to	 distressed	 restorers,	 who	 must	 continue	 working	




is	 easy	 to	 understand	 why	 such	 philosophical	 debate	 will	 and	
should	go	on.	It	will	go	on	because	restoration	work	–	when	ambi-
guously	 planned	 –	 can	 cause	 more	 damage	 than	 the	 natural	
process	 of	 deterioration.	 And	 it	 should	 go	 on	 because	 unless	 we	




views	of	the	parties	 involved.	 It	 is	my	contention	that	though	we	
probably	have	to	accept	the	impossibility	of	a	singular	and	objec-
tive	theory	on	the	care	and	preservation	of	works	of	art,	this	issue	
should	 excite	 rather	 than	 discourage	 widespread	 discussion.	 Ars 
longa, philosophia perennis.	
	
